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HARBISON v. BELL 
SARAH RUTLEDGE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 27, 2007, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied 
Edward Jerome Harbison’s motion for a certificate of appealability.1 
Earlier, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Tennessee had denied Harbison’s motion to expand the appointment 
of the Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee, Inc., to allow 
it to represent him in state clemency proceedings.2 
Harbison petitioned the United States Supreme Court and was 
granted certiorari on two issues.3 This Commentary will address the 
first issue: whether federally-funded counsel may represent a habeas 
petitioner in a state clemency proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) 
and (e) when the state has denied the petitioner state-funded 
counsel.4 
 
 * 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Harbison v. Bell, 503 F.3d 566, 567 (6th Cir. 2007). A certificate of appealability must 
be issued by a circuit justice or judge before an appeal may be taken to the circuit court of 
appeals from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding for relief from state detention. 28 
U.S.C.A. § 2253(c) (West 2008). As discussed below, this Commentary will not address the issue 
of whether Harbison was required to obtain a certificate of appealability. See infra. note 4. 
 2. Id. at 570. 
 3. Brief for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Harbison, 503 F.3d 566 (No. 07-8521). 
 4. The second issue for which certiorari was granted is whether a petitioner must obtain a 
certificate of appealability to appeal an order denying a request for counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 
3599(a)(2) and (e). Id. Petitioner, Respondent, and the Solicitor General all agree that the text 
of 28 U.S.C. § 2253 does not require a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of 
clemency counsel under § 3599. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, Harbison, 503 F.3d 566 (No. 07-
8521); Brief of Respondent at 8, Harbison, 503 F.3d 566 (No. 07-8521); Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Harbison, 503 F.3d 566 (No. 07-8521). It is unlikely that the 
certificate of appealability issue will be dispositive; instead, the availability of federally-funded 
counsel during state clemency proceedings will likely be the dispositive issue. 
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II.  FACTS 
In January of 1983, Edith Russell returned home where she found 
Harbison and an accomplice burglarizing her home.5 Harbison killed 
her by hitting her repeatedly in the head with a heavy vase.6 After 
questioning the accomplice, police searched Harbison’s girlfriend’s 
house and found several of the Russells’ possessions, including a 
heavy marble vase, which tested positive for blood.7 Following this 
discovery, the police vacuumed the carpet of Harbison’s car and 
found crystalline calcite fragments “consistent with the marble vase.”8 
On February 21, 1983, police arrested Harbison on suspicion of 
burglary and murder.9 Harbison gave a taped a confession in which he 
described the burglary, Mrs. Russell’s return, and the struggle during 
which he hit her with the marble vase.10 At trial, however, Harbison 
recanted his confession and testified that he had confessed because 
the police had threatened to arrest his girlfriend and take away her 
children.11 Ultimately, the jury that tried Harbison discounted his 
testimony, convicted him of first degree murder, and sentenced him to 
death.12 
Harbison appealed his conviction to the Tennessee Supreme 
Court, which upheld both the conviction and the sentence.13 In 1997, 
he filed his first petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus.14 This 
petition was dismissed by the district court in 2001, and the dismissal 
was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit in 2005.15 
Harbison next filed a motion for relief from judgment, which the 
district court also denied.16 Subsequently, Harbison requested leave to 
expand the appointment of his federally-funded counsel17 to allow 
 
 5. State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 315–16 (Tenn. 1986). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 315. 
 13. Id. at 320. 
 14. Harbison v. Bell, No. 1:97-CV-52, 2007 WL 128954, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 16, 2007). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at *6. The Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee, Inc., had represented 
Harbison in his habeas petition since 1997. 
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that counsel to represent him in state clemency proceedings.18 The 
district court composed an extensive memorandum that analyzed the 
circuit split over whether to grant federally-funded counsel for state 
clemency proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3599, but ultimately found 
that its decision was controlled by the Sixth Circuit’s holding that “the 
statute does not entitle a death-row inmate to federally-funded 
counsel in state post-conviction cases.”19 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. 18 U.S.C. § 3599 
In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress authorized federal 
courts to appoint counsel for defendants in capital cases who are 
financially unable to obtain representation.20 In 1994, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the statute’s language to facially grant “indigent 
capital defendants a mandatory right to qualified legal counsel,” 
which vests prior to the defendant’s application for habeas relief.21 
Subsection (a)(2) specifically entitles indigent defendants in state or 
federal habeas proceedings to the appointment of counsel.22 The 
 
 18. Harbison v. Bell, No. 1:97-CV-52, 2007 WL 128954, at *1, *6. Clemency is the power to 
pardon a criminal or commute a criminal sentence. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 269 (8th ed. 
2004). The Tennessee clemency process is non-judicial. See BOARD OF PROBATION AND 
PAROLE, EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY available at http://www.tn.gov/bopp/Docs/ 
ClemencyApplicationProcess=02-13-03.pdf (detailing all parties and steps involved in 
Tennessee clemency process); DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, DEATH PENALTY 
POLICY BY STATE available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-policy-state 
(noting only judicial clemency involvement in California proceedings to pardon or commutate 
sentence of twice convicted felon). In Tennessee, a Board of Probation and Parole processes 
applications grants hearings when warranted and makes non-binding recommendations to the 
Governor. Id. Among states that impose the death penalty, over half, including Tennessee, give 
the Governor the final authority to grant or deny clemency. Brief of Current and Former 
Governors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4 (citing MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, 
RELIEF FROM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-
STATE RESOURCE GUIDE 99–101 (2006); DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra); Id. 
at 4 n.2 (citing LOVE, supra, at 32–36). 
 19. Harbison v. Bell, No. 1:97-CV-52, 2007 WL 128954, at *6–*7 (citing House v. Bell, 332 
F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). 
 20. 21 U.S.C.A § 848(q) (West 2006) (repealed 2006). In 2006, Congress reenacted the 
entire section verbatim in the Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 
Title II, § 222, 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (120 Stat.) 230. The original language, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
3599, continues to regulate the appointment of counsel for financially unable defendants. 
Compare 18 U.S.C.A § 3599 (West 2008) with 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(q) (West 2006) (repealed 
2006). 
 21. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 854–55 (1994). 
 22. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3599(a)(2) (West 2008) (”In any post conviction proceeding under 
section 2254 or 2255 of title 28, United States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death 
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statute also requires that the appointment accord with subsections (b) 
through (f).23 
Subsection (e) details the scope of the appointed attorney’s 
representation24: “[E]ach attorney so appointed shall represent the 
defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial 
proceedings . . . and shall also represent the defendant in such 
competency proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be 
available to the defendant.”25 
The circuit courts have split over the proper interpretation of 
subsection (e)’s final phrase, hereinafter referred to as the “clemency 
phrase.” Some circuits have read the phrase broadly so as to grant 
defendants the right to appointed counsel in both federal or state 
clemency proceedings;26 others have interpreted the appointment 
narrowly so as to apply it only in federal clemency proceedings.27 
B. Three Circuits Have Found No Right to Federally-Funded 
Counsel in State Proceedings 
The argument against appointing federally-funded counsel in state 
clemency proceedings originated in petitions for counsel appointment 
in non-clemency state post-conviction proceedings. First, in In re 
Lindsey, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a petitioner’s right to have a 
federally-appointed attorney represent him in state collateral review 
proceedings.28 The court read the relevant sections of the statute to be 
inapplicable to state proceedings.29 The court expressed concern that a 
broad reading would “have the practical effect of supplanting state-
court systems for the appointment of counsel in collateral review 
cases” and would encourage future petitioners to “ignore the 
 
sentence, any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation 
. . . shall be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys . . . .”(emphasis omitted)). 
 23. Id. Subsections (b), (c), and (d) discuss the number and qualifications of attorneys to be 
appointed. Subsection (f) concerns the appointment of non-attorney services. Id. 
 24. Id. § 3599(e). 
 25. Id. 
 26. E.g., Hain v. Mullin, 436 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (finding 
appointment extends to state court clemency proceedings); Hill v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801, 803 
(8th Cir. 1993) (finding counsel could be appointed for state clemency proceedings when the 
court deems it reasonably necessary). 
 27. E.g., House v. Bell, 332 F.3d 997, 998–99 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding no right to 
federally appointed counsel in state proceedings); Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459, 462–63 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (same); King v. Moore, 312 F.3d 1365, 1365–66 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (same). 
 28. In re Lindsey, 875 F.2d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 29. Id. at 1506. 
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exhaustion requirement” and file for federal habeas relief before 
filing for state habeas relief.30 
Next, in Sterling v. Scott, the Fifth Circuit Appellate Court refused 
to appoint federally-funded counsel for the petitioner while he 
exhausted state post-conviction remedies.31 The court expressed three 
grounds for a narrow reading of the clemency phrase, which have 
been echoed in subsequent circuit decisions.32 First, the court read the 
right to appointed counsel in the context of surrounding statutory 
provisions, so that it applied “only in connection with federal 
proceedings.”33 Second, the court considered the cost of providing 
counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, and stated that 
“Congress is usually more express in its intent when it decides to fund 
a project;” therefore, the court found no such express intent.34 Third, 
the court emphasized, in the interest of federalism, that state court 
proceedings need to remain free from interference by the federal 
court.35  
In Clark v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit applied the Sterling 
reasoning to state clemency proceedings.36 After Clark’s execution, his 
federally-appointed counsel sought “compensation and 
reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with [Clark’s] 
state clemency proceeding.”37 The court acknowledged that Sterling 
had not addressed clemency proceedings, but cited the opinion as 
instructive and held that the statute did not apply to state clemency 
proceedings.38 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Sterling v. Scott, 57 F.3d 451, 458 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 32. E.g. Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459, 462–63 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing the Sterling 
analysis in detail); King v. Moore, 312 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citing 
Sterling to support contextual and legislative history arguments). 
 33. Sterling, 57 F.3d at 457. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (“It would seem indelicate on our part, absent an express intent on the part of 
Congress, to permit intrusion into the state judicial process by having lawyers who are practicing 
before state courts, representing state court defendants and petitioners pursuant to state court 
rules, to have their qualifications set by federal statute (21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(5), (6)) and to be 
answerable, at least in part, to federal judges for their conduct.”). 
 36. Clark, 278 F.3d. at 462–63. The petitioner in Clark was denied certiorari on the issue of 
reimbursement under the statute for legal work performed in a state clemency proceeding. In re 
Taylor, 537 U.S. 1079 (2002) (mem.). 
 37. Clark, 278 F.3d at 460. 
 38. Id. at 462–63. 
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The Eleventh Circuit in King v. Moore agreed with the Fifth 
Circuit that the statute does not apply to state clemency proceedings.39 
Citing the above cases, the court supported its construction with the 
three-part reasoning used by the Fifth Circuit in Sterling40 and 
expressed a practical concern that a broad interpretation would 
“entitle habeas petitioners—if successful in having their state 
convictions vacated in federal court—to federally funded counsel for 
their resulting new state trial, state appeal, and state habeas 
proceedings.”41 Finally, the court cited the legislative history of the 
statute, which was “added to the bill very late in the session and 
seemingly without floor debate,” arguing that the hasty manner in 
which it was added indicated that Congress did not intend the “big 
and innovative” consequences that a broad reading of the statute 
would permit.42 
Most recently, the Sixth Circuit denied a petitioner federally-
funded counsel for state post-conviction claims in House v. Bell.43 The 
court agreed with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits “that Section 
848(q)(4)(B) must be construed narrowly.”44 The court cited King’s 
reasoning and concluded with its own solution to the federalism 
concerns: “The rule is simple. The two representations shall not mix. 
The state will be responsible for state proceedings, and the federal 
government will be responsible for federal proceedings.”45 
C. Two Circuits Have Found a Right to Federally–Funded Counsel in 
State Clemency Proceedings When Reasonably Necessary 
Though the Eighth Circuit in Hill v. Lockhart denied an attorney’s 
request for compensation for the work he performed in a state 
 
 39. King v. Moore, 312 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). 
 40. See id. at 1367 (“Before we would decide to obligate the United States to pay for 
counsel in a state proceeding, Congress’s intent to pay would need to be so clear as to leave 
room for no other reasonable interpretation. . . . [T]he entanglement of federal courts in state 
proceedings would raise substantial problems impacting on our federalism. . . . Section 848(q) is 
entitled ‘Appeal in capital cases; counsel for financially unable defendants’ and seems directed 
to the appeals of death-penalty sentences in federal cases.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1367–68 (“The whole-business of federal compensation (controlled by the federal 
courts) for lawyers acting in state proceedings on behalf of state prisoners seems too big and 
innovative to have been dealt with at the tail end of a session as the legislation was being 
approved at the last moment.”). 
 43. House v. Bell, 332 F.3d 997, 998 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 44. Id. at 998–99. 
 45. Id. 
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clemency proceeding, the holding did not preclude appointments of 
federally-funded counsel for such assistance.46 The Eighth Circuit read 
the statute to “evidence[] a congressional intent to insure that 
indigent state petitioners receive ‘reasonably necessary’ competency 
and clemency services from appointed, compensated counsel.”47 The 
court determined that appointing counsel to assist with a state 
clemency proceeding is only reasonably necessary when “the request 
is made as part of a non-frivolous federal habeas corpus proceeding” 
and “state law provides no avenue to obtain compensation for these 
services.”48 Additionally, federally-funded attorneys must request 
compensation for services in state proceedings prior to rendering 
those services.49 
In Hain v. Mullin, the Tenth Circuit read the statute broadly so as 
to authorize federally-appointed attorneys to represent state capital 
defendants in state clemency proceedings.50 The court emphasized that 
the statute explicitly grants representation to defendants who are 
proceeding under § 225451 and that defendants proceed under § 2254 
to seek vacature of a state sentence.52 Because only state clemency can 
alter a state sentence, the statute’s grant of representation to § 2254 
defendants can only be given effect in state clemency proceedings.53 
The court found that reading the statute narrowly to apply only to 
federal clemency proceedings “ignores the plain meaning of the 
statute, violates the canon of statutory interpretation requiring us to 
give effect to every word of a statute, and reads the statute out of 
context.”54 
IV.  HOLDING 
In Harbison v. Bell, in the portion of the opinion relevant to this 
Commentary, the Sixth Circuit Court considered whether Harbison 
could be represented in his state clemency proceeding by federally-
funded counsel.55 The court disposed of the issue in fewer than five 
 
 46. Hill v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Hain v. Mullin, 436 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 51. Id. at 1171–72. 
 52. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2008). 
 53. Hain, 436 F.3d at 1171–72. 
 54. Id. at 1173. 
 55. Harbison v. Bell, 503 F.3d 567, 570 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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sentences.56 Citing its ruling in House v. Bell “that § 3599(e) . . . does 
not authorize federal compensation for legal representation in state 
matters,” the court found no right to federal compensation for legal 
representation in state clemency proceedings.57 In conclusion, the 
court denied Harbison’s motion for a certificate of appealability to 
expand the appointment of his federally-funded counsel to state 
clemency proceedings.58 
V.  ANALYSIS 
A. Extension of Federally Appointed Legal Representation into State 
Matters 
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Harbison v. Bell is problematic 
because it denied counsel for clemency proceedings based on the 
reasoning of a prior opinion that applied only to judicial proceedings 
and because it failed to address subsequent developments in its sister 
circuits and in the state of Tennessee. 
First, the court relied on precedent, established in House v. Bell, 
that is inapplicable to non-judicial state proceedings.59 In House, the 
court cited the “weight of the authority” from its sister circuits as the 
primary reason to deny the request for appointment of counsel.60 
Though the Tenth Circuit in Hain v. Mullin had interpreted the statute 
to apply to state clemency proceedings a mere six months before 
House, the Sixth Circuit failed to mention the case.61 The court 
repeated the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ concern that federal courts 
would interfere with the independent control of states over their own 
judicial proceedings.62 As the Fifth Circuit explained in Sterling v. 
Scott, “[c]ounsel who are appointed and qualified and whose pay is 
 
 56. Id. at 570. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. In the remainder of the opinion, the court denied a request for permission to file a 
successive habeas corpus petition and denied a motion for a certificate of appealability to appeal 
the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion. Id. at 568. Harbison did not petition for certiorari regarding 
either of these issues. 
 59.  See infra. note 18. 
 60. House v. Bell, 332 F.3d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 999 (citing King v. Moore, 312 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); 
Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2002); Sterling v. Scott, 57 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 1995); Hill 
v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1993); In re Lindsey, 875 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
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approved by federal judges are ultimately controlled by and 
responsible to federal courts.”63 
The House court was gravely concerned with the federalism 
implications of federal financial support for key players in state 
judicial proceedings. It declared that entitling a petitioner to federal 
counsel in subsequent state proceedings is “unacceptable.”64 The 
decision quoted heavily from the Eleventh Circuit’s King v. Moore 
decision, specifically that it was likely that “federal compensation 
(controlled by federal courts) for lawyers acting in state proceeding 
on behalf of state prisoners” was not Congress’s intent when it drafted 
§ 848(q)(4)(B).65 This precedent, however, is not a sufficient basis to 
deny Harbison’s petition for the appointment of counsel for state 
clemency proceedings under § 3599(e). The Sixth Circuit’s use of 
House—a case about representation in state post-conviction judicial 
proceedings—as precedent for the right to representation in non-
judicial state clemency proceedings, is certainly an overly-broad 
application of precedent and could be considered misplaced reliance 
on dicta.66 
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit failed to acknowledge two 
developments regarding clemency counsel that could have affected its 
decision to apply the House precedent to Harbison without further 
analysis. Though the Sixth Circuit declared in House that “the weight 
of the authority does not support”67 expansion of the federally-
appointed counsel’s representation, it failed to consider in Harbison 
the two circuit decisions that did support expansion of federally-
appointed counsel. 
First, the Sixth Circuit cited Hill v. Lockhart, without qualification, 
as a case that construed the statute narrowly to “not authorize federal 
compensation for representation in state proceedings.”68 The Eighth 
Circuit, however, held in Lockhart that the plain language of the 
statute could grant a right to federally-funded counsel under the 
 
 63. Sterling v. Scott, 57 F.3d 451, 457 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 64. House, 332 F.3d at 999. 
 65. Id. at 999 (quoting King, 312 F.3d at 1367–68). 
 66. See King v. Moore, 312 F.3d 1365, 1366–67 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (stating 
that its prior opinion in In re Lindsey was dicta and not controlling “because Lindsey did not 
involve state clemency proceedings”). Ironically the Sixth Circuit relied primarily on the King 
decision to justify its holding in House, 332 F.3d at 999. 
 67. House, 332 F.3d at 999. 
 68. Id. at 998–99. 
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statute in state clemency proceedings.69 Focusing on the phrase 
“reasonably necessary” in the statutory section now codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2), the court determined that services provided for 
state clemency proceedings “can be” reasonably necessary under the 
statute unless the request is frivolous or the state already provides 
compensation for such services.70 The attorney’s petition failed in 
Lockhart because he had not shown “that state law provides no 
avenue to obtain compensation” for legal services performed in a 
state clemency proceeding.71 
The Eighth Circuit’s analysis of “reasonably necessary” would 
have been particularly relevant in Harbison. The previous year, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court had granted an order stating that “no 
statute, rule of court, or constitutional provision authorizes this Court 
to appoint the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender to represent 
[petitioner] at clemency proceedings.”72 By the Eighth Circuit’s 
standard, Harbison’s indigence and the lack of any state procedure by 
which an indigent petitioner could seek counsel would have rendered 
appointed counsel reasonably necessary under the statute. The Sixth 
Circuit, however, addressed neither the plain language of the statute 
nor the lack of any state avenue for compensation. 
Second, subsequent to House but prior to Harbison, the Tenth 
Circuit held that the plain language of § 848(q)(4)(B) 
“[u]nambiguously” entitled state petitioners to federally funded 
counsel and services by specifically including those seeking relief 
under § 2254 which is available only to state prisoners.73 Because there 
is no federal executive power to pardon state prisoners, the court read 
the phrase “executive or other clemency” to indicate congressional 
intent to fund representation in state clemency proceedings.74 Unlike 
the Sixth Circuit, which listed the Eighth Circuit in accord with the 
Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged a split 
among the circuits and aligned itself with the Eighth Circuit’s broad 
interpretation of the plain language of the statute.75  
 
 69. Hill v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801, 803–04 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 70. Id. at 803–04. 
 71. Id. at 803. 
 72. State v. Johnson, No. M1987-00072-SC-DPE-DD (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2006) (per curiam) 
(order denying motion to appoint clemency counsel). 
 73. Hain v. Mullin, 436 F.3d 1168, 1171 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 74. Id. at 1172 
 75. Id. (“Acknowledging a circuit split on the issue, we nonetheless see no other logical 
way to read the statute. As expressed by the Eighth Circuit ‘The plain language of § 848(q) 
DO NOT DELETE 1/8/2009  11:51:31 AM 
2009] HARBISON V. BELL 225 
In House, the Sixth Circuit based its holding on the premise that 
all federal jurisdictions that had addressed the issue had prohibited 
the appointment of federally-paid attorneys in state proceedings,76 
and cited no authority beyond its survey of jurisdictions.77 As the court 
had no basis for its holding in House independent of the holdings of 
its fellow circuit courts, the Sixth Circuit should have corrected its 
interpretation of the Eighth Circuit’s holding and factored the 
subsequent Tenth Circuit decision into the balance of authorities 
before applying the House precedent to Harbison. 
VI.  ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION 
Because the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Harbison v. Bell contains 
almost no legal analysis, the Supreme Court is likely to focus its 
opinion on the arguments that make up the two sides of the circuit 
split and their application to state clemency proceedings. 
A. The Case Against Appointing Counsel for State Clemency Is Not 
Persuasive 
The various circuits’ holdings against the appointment of 
federally-funded counsel in state clemency proceedings have centered 
on four key arguments. The first two arguments—that allowing 
federal courts to appoint federally-funded counsel would introduce 
federal court control into state court proceedings and would 
encourage petitioners to ignore exhaustion requirements—are not 
persuasive in the context of clemency proceedings. Clemency 
proceedings are non-judicial and are subsequent to state judicial 
proceedings. Because clemency is sought subsequent to judicial 
proceedings, it is unlikely that state prisoners would forego state 
exhaustion requirements to obtain federal clemency. Additionally, 
states are free to provide legal representation to indigent petitioners 
in state clemency proceedings and thereby avoid any federal 
intrusion. 
The two textual arguments—that the context of the statute 
indicates that Congress intended to grant representation only in 
 
evidences a congressional intent to insure that indigent state petitioners receive reasonably 
necessary clemency services from appointed, compensated counsel.”). 
 76. House v. Bell, 332 F.3d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 2003) (“As the weight of authority does not 
support House’s request . . . House’s motion . . . is DENIED.”). 
 77. Id. at 998–99. 
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federal clemency proceedings and that the lack of specific language 
signifies that Congress did not intend to fund counsel for state 
proceedings—are more relevant within clemency proceedings. Given, 
however, the lack of any overtly conflicting legislative history and the 
Supreme Court’s hesitancy to engage in creative statutory 
interpretation, these arguments are likely to be only minimally 
persuasive to the Court. 
B. The Case for Appointment of Counsel for State Clemency Is 
Persuasive 
The plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) and (e) favors the 
argument that appointment of counsel should extend to state 
clemency proceedings. In Herrera v. Collins, the Court described 
clemency as “the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of 
justice where judicial process has been exhausted.”78 Given the 
linguistic interpretation that would be necessary to read the statute to 
apply only in federal clemency proceedings combined with the 
Tennessee Supreme Court’s recent determination that it has no 
jurisdiction to appoint counsel for state prisoners in state clemency 
proceedings, it seems unlikely that the Court would decide Harbison 
such that state prisoners would be left without legal assistance when 
they pursue that “historic remedy.” 
C. Likely Disposition 
It is likely that the Supreme Court will overturn the holding of the 
Sixth Circuit Court and find that the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 
3599 grants criminal defendants seeking to vacate or set aside a death 
sentence the right to have federally-funded representation appointed 
in state clemency proceedings when the state provides no avenue for 
the compensation of clemency counsel. 
 
 
 78. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 412 (1993). 
